Now, let us examine the defining factor in both the rise and the fall of the Pahlavi regime: the relationship between the Shah and the United States. The relationship was a longstanding, cordial relationship that began in earnest with the return of the Shah to power in 1953. According to Rosadi, the United States had been primarily responsible for the coup that overthrew Mossadeq and restored the Shah to the throne.[1] And in the intervening 25 years the United States had given the regime near total support, including massive military aid. This was done in support of a regime that was an important ally in a strategic part of the world.

Seemingly, that relationship was set to continue in this same vein as the Carter administration took over the reins of the US government in early 1977. In two separate speeches on December 31, 1977 President Carter first said, “The Shah and I share a hope that peace will come to the Middle East and that our military alliance remains unshakeable [italics added], we may help to reduce the level of tensions and armaments throughout the world”.[2] The President also said,

      "We have no other nation on Earth who is closer to us in planning for our mutual military security. We have no other nation with whom we have closer consultation on regional problems that concern us both. And there is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship." [3]

These statements should have reassured the Shah, who according to Parsons was apprehensive of the victory by Carter in the 1976 elections. “He had never been comfortable with Democrat [sic] Presidents, who were more disposed…to inject a moralizing element  into the formulation of American foreign policy.”[4] But, according to Hoveyda, the Shah misjudged the Carter administration’s true feelings towards him: “The Carter administration that entered the White House in 1977 considered him as a rather cumbersome ally and looked forward to a change in Iran’s political system.” [5]Similarly, Parsons stated that the Carter administration’s spousal of human rights in the Third World, including Iran, and the emphasis on the need to cut back on transfers of military equipment heightened the Shah’s fears that America would no longer offer him total support. The elimination of political freedom and the unleashing of the SAVAK on political dissenters was coming back to haunt the regime, and the United States was beginning to pull away at a time when the regime would find itself needing American support most.

In 1978 a “perfect storm” would converge on the Pahlavi regime that would severely test the strength of their relationship with the United States. The unrest and uprising by the people of Iran (spurred on by the mullahs), the economic difficulties brought on by the Shah’s anti-business campaign, and the “Black Friday” massacre converged to bring on a crisis for the Pahlavi regime. The “Black Friday” incident had touched off large scale anti-government riots throughout the country and according to Bakhash had pushed the Shah into a terrible state of indecisiveness in how to deal with the uprisings.[6] The Shah wavered between the use of “clamp down” tactics and making concessions to the opposition. And much of this indecision could be traced to the mixed signals that were coming from Washington; after decades of giving unconditional support to the Shah, the new Carter administration never gave him any definitive guidance on what course of action he should take to deal with the uprising. This was due to a split within the upper reaches of the Carter administration itself. On one side stood Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who advocated the establishment of a coalition government in Iran that would include the Ayatollah Khomeini and his radical Islamists[7]; on the other side was National Security Advisor Abigniew Brzezinski who felt that the United States should offer support to the Shah regardless of what he chose to do in putting down the uprising.[8]

Even as the Shah wavered between “crackdown” and concession, he continued to look to the United States for directions on how to proceed. The problem with this was that the one person in the US government who could ultimately give the Shah guidance was wavering as well. According to Rosadi, “President Carter wavered between these two positions, initially supporting the Shah but reluctant to recommend the need for a crackdown, followed by support for a national coalition government although never foreclosing the possibility of a military coup.” This indecisiveness from Washington resulted in the Shah never getting a clear message on what actions America would support; thusly, the Shah never made any definitive moves to shore up his regime’s authority. This inaction would prove fatal to the Pahlavi regime in the months to come.

In December 1978, the American and British governments began urging the Shah to abdicate the throne and to leave Iran[9]. The Shah initially resisted, but as pressure mounted from within and without, he finally acquiesced and turned control of the Iranian government over to the Regency Council and Prime Minister Shapour Bakktiar. On January 16, 1979 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi boarded a plane in Tehran, along with his family, and left his native country never to return.

Looking back, we an see how many individual situations: an autocratic ruling style, unresolved and continuing conflicts with Muslim clerics, mismanagement of the economy, and a changing relationship with the United States weakened the Shah’s hold on the government of Iran. And when all of those elements converged, we see that a “perfect storm” assaulted the regime that it simply could not withstand. In the final analysis, the words of former British ambassador to Iran Sir Anthony Parsons give a great summary of the Shah’s major difficulties:

        Equally we [ambassadors to Iran] realized that his original character had not changed, that he was still indecisive and lacking in the bloody resolution which characterizes the traditional autocrat, and that he had a pathetic and altogether mistaken belief that the Americans and British, if not determined for their own arcane and incomprehensible reasons to overthrow him, must somehow have the ability to maintain him on his throne.[10]

We can only wonder and speculate how different the situation would be in the Middle East had the Shah been able to hold onto power in Iran. It is certain that there would never have been the infamous 444 Days of Americans held hostage, and we can speculate that with a pro-American ally holding the purse strings that Iranian oil money would not have been funneled into supporting terrorist outfits like Hezbollah.  

But in the final analysis, we can see that as much as the Shah failed himself, he was also failed by the US government in his most urgent time of need. Had we had a President who realized that personal morality cannot be the basis of American international policy, or one who realized that sometimes it necessary to be allied with regimes that are not perfect we would mst likely still be looking at Iran as an ally, and not as a menace in the region. We did not lose Iran as much as a weak administration gave it away, and we are haunted by their poor grasp of international relations to this day.